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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
James Zane Parmer appeals from the district court's summary dismissal 
of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts of the underlying criminal 
case as follows: 
Parmer provided massage services to K.R., a fourteen-year 
old female, to treat her for migraine headaches and leg pain. K.R. 
reported that, at one session, Parmer was using a vibrating device 
to relieve tension in the muscles of her inner thigh when he placed 
the device in a position to cause her sexual arousal. Additionally, 
she reported that Parmer had also engaged in manual-genital 
contact. 
State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 213, 207 P.3d 186, 189 (Ct. App. 2009). 
After reporting the incident to law enforcement authorities, an officer 
arranged and recorded a "confrontation call" between K.R. and Parmer. (R., 
pp.521-522,790-7951.) On the call, Parmer acknowledged to K.R. that he 
"probably got [too] intimate" with the vibrating device. (R., p.790.) Parmer told 
K.R. that he chose to use the vibrating device because "it was there," and 
1 In support of his petition for post-conviction relief, Parmer submitted transcripts 
of the "confrontation call" between K.R. and Parmer, and of Parmer's interview by 
police. (R., pp.790-826.) The district court granted the state's motion to strike 
these exhibits because they had not been properly authenticated. (R., pp.912-
918; 5/26/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-11.) However, the district court also took judicial 
notice of the actual recordings of these interviews, and considered them in 
granting the state's motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.1031-1033, 1106-
1112; 5/26/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.12-21.) The recordings themselves do not appear to 
be a part of the appellate record. 
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because K. R. had reacted negatively to other therapeutic techniques. (R., 
pp.790-795.) 
Shortly thereafter, officers interviewed Parmer. (R., pp. 797-825.) Parmer 
told the officers that he utilized the vibrating device instead of his hands to 
massage K.R.'s inner thigh because his hands were tired. (R., pp.801-802.) 
After the interview, Parmer was arrested and charged with lewd conduct with a 
minor child under sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 190, 207 P.3d at 
189; (R., p.825). Parmer's first trial ended in a hung jury. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 
190, 207 P.3d at 189. 
Prior to the second trial, the district court granted the state's motion in 
limine to exclude, as hearsay, Parmer's statements to police. (R., p.129.) The 
district court permitted the state to present testimony, pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), 
from eight witnesses who described various inappropriate sexual touching that 
occurred during massages provided by Parmer. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 213, 207 
P.3d at 190. 
K. R. testified at trial and described her physical condition and her history 
of massage treatment received at Parmer's place of employment. (R., pp.484-
487.2) K.R. described how on "one or two occasions," Parmer massaged her 
inner thigh, very close to her vagina, in a way that made her uncomfortable. (R., 
p.487.) Several months later, K.R. testified, Parmer used a vibrating device to 
2 Parmer submitted reporter's transcripts of the two jury trials and of other court 
proceedings in support of his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.115-747, 
852-857, 1021-1026.) Those transcripts are included in the appellate clerk's 
record. In this brief, citations to these transcripts refer to the corresponding page 
numbers of the electronic file, "ParmerCR." 
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massage her inner thigh. (R, pp.487-489.) During this session, Parmer moved 
the device over K.R.'s vagina and clitoris, moved K.R.'s underwear with the 
device, and also penetrated K.R.'s vagina with his fingers. (R., pp.489-490.) 
After the session, K.R. reported the incident to her mother, was transferred to the 
CARES unit at St. Luke's Hospital, and was interviewed by a police officer. (R., 
p.491.) 
Parmer testified in his own defense. (R., pp.650-717.) Parmer 
acknowledged he used "poor judgment" in massaging K.R.'s inner thigh with the 
vibrating device, but denied touching K.R.'s vagina or clitoris with either his 
hands or the device, and denied having any sexual intent during the treatment 
sessions. (R., pp.698, 714.) Parmer testified that he utilized the vibrating device 
to massage K.R. because his hands were tired from a heavy workload, and 
because he suffered from arthritis. (R., p.693.) The prosecutor cross-examined 
Parmer on the inconsistency between this explanation of the motive for his use of 
the vibrating device he presented at trial, and the one he gave to K.R. during the 
confrontation call - that he didn't know how else to effectively manage K.R.'s 
pain. (R., p.713.) 
The jury found Parmer guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct. Parmer, 147 
Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. The district court imposed a unified sentence of 
20 years with seven years fixed. kl On direct appeal, Parmer asserted various 
challenges regarding the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, and contended that the district 
court abused its discretion by sustaining the state's hearsay objection to 
testimony concerning statements that he made during the police interview. 
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Parmer, 147 Idaho at 213-224, 207 P.3d 189-200. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction. kl 
Parmer filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting 12 claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (R., pp.5-22, 827-847.) Relevant to this 
appeal, Parmer asserted that this trial counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize 
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) to attempt to introduce the police interview into evidence as a 
prior consistent statement (R., pp.832-835), and for failing to elicit "proper 
testimony" concerning the ilioinguinal nerve and anterior labial nerve - contact 
with which can be subjectively mistaken for physical contact with the clitoris and 
labia. (R., pp.842-843.) 
The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal of the 
petition. (R., pp.1155-1156.) The court concluded that Parmer failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact necessitating an evidentiary hearing on either 
claim because: (1) I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) did not apply to Parmer's statements to 
police because those statements occurred after the motive to fabricate arose (R., 
pp.1106-1112); and (2) even if trial counsel's failure to introduce testimony 
regarding the ilioinguinal nerve constituted deficient performance, Parmer failed 




Parmer states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the claim that 
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to have a 
police interview admitted into evidence for the non-hearsay 
purpose of rebutting a claim of recent fabrication? Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 
Idaho Constitution, Art. I,§ 13. 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the claim that 
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to present 
evidence concerning the ilioinguinal nerve? Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 
Idaho Constitution, Art. I,§ 13. 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Parmer failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Parmer Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Parmer contends that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed 
his petition for post-conviction relief. (See generally Appellant's brief.) 
Specifically, Parmer contends that the district court erred in concluding that 
Parmer's counsel was not deficient for failing to attempt to utilize I.R.E. 
801 (d)(1 )(B) as grounds for admitting Parmer's police interrogation, and that 
Parmer failed to establish prejudice from the absence of testimony regarding the 
ilioinguinal nerve. (See generally Appellant's brief.) 
However, a review of the record reveals that Parmer has failed to show 
that the district court erred in summarily dismissing these claims. Parmer's 
statements made to police could not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) 
because Parmer's motive to fabricate - the existence of the criminal investigation 
against him - was already in place at the time he made those statements. 
Further, even assuming Parmer's counsel was deficient for failing to elicit 
testimony regarding the ilioinguinal nerve, Parmer failed to show a reasonable 
possibility that such evidence would have resulted in a different trial outcome. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
6 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
C. Parmer Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact With Respect 
To His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
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professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
1. The I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) Hearsay Exception Would Not Have 
Permitted The Admission Of Parmer's Statements To The Police 
Interviewer 
"In determining whether an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the 
underlying criminal action constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court 
may consider whether the motion would have been successful." Cooke v. State, 
149 Idaho 233, 246, 233 P.3d 164, 177 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Sanchez v. State, 
127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642,646 (Ct. App. 1995); Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 
155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1993)). "If this Court determines that the 
motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, then generally 
counsel will not be found deficient for failing to pursue it and the petitioner could 
not have been prejudiced by the lack of pursuit." kl 
In this case, the district court correctly determined that the I.R.E. 
801 (d)(1)(B) hearsay exception would not have permitted the admission of 
Parmer's statements to the police interviewer. (R., pp.1109-1112.) Therefore, 
the district court was correct to summarily dismiss this claim. 
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Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1 )(B) provides that a statement is not 
hearsay if: 
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is 
... (B) consistent with declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut 
an express or implied charge against declarant of recent fabrication 
or improper influence or motive. 
The policy underlying the rule allowing the admissibility of prior consistent 
statements to rebut a claim of recent fabrication is to show that the declarant 
made statements similar to those claimed to be false in a context where there 
was no undue influence. See State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 58-59, 896 P.2d 
962, 966-67 (1995) (CARES interview admissible as prior consistent statements 
where defendant claimed child's testimony at trial was the result of 
"programming" by the child's mother); see also State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 
894-895, 980 P.2d 552, 558-559 (1999) (concluding that a statement was not 
admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(8) because it was not a "prior consistent 
statement which preceded any motive on the part of [the declarant] to lie") 
(emphasis added).) 
Consistent with this rationale, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
United States Supreme Court have interpreted corresponding Federal Rule of 
Evidence F.R.E. 801 (d)(1 )(B) as requiring the prior consistent statement to have 
been made before the motive to fabricate arose: 
As statements meeting [the requirements of F.R.E. 
801 (d)(1 )(B)] are not hearsay, they go beyond rebuttal of attack on 
the declarant and constitute substantive evidence in the case. 
[Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157 (1995)]. The statement 
may not be admitted "to counter all forms of impeachment or to 
9 
bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited." Id. 
The Rule "speaks of a party rebutting an alleged motive, not 
bolstering the veracity of the story told." [Id. at 158.] This limitation 
reinforces the requirement that the consistent statements "must 
have been made before the alleged influence, or motive to 
fabricate, arose." Id. "A consistent statement that predates the 
motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was 
contrived as a consequence of that motive." Id. 
"[F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)] should not be read to open "the 
floodgates" to any prior consistent statement. [Id. at 696.]" 
United States v. Gonzalez, 533 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized that the motive to 
fabricate for the purposes of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) may arise before the declarant 
is formally charged or placed in custody if the declarant knows at the time the 
statement is made that he is being investigated by law enforcement in connection 
with a crime. United States v. Bao, 189 F.3d 860, 864-865 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that declarant already had a motive to fabricate where it was clear 
that an investigation of his printing operation was underway.) 
In this case, as the district court correctly recognized, while Parmer did 
testify at trial, was subject to cross-examination concerning his motives for 
utilizing the vibrating device, and while the state did offer an implied charge 
against Parmer of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, the police 
interview was not admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 801 (d)(1 )(B) because the 
interview clearly took place after the motive to fabricate - the criminal 
investigation - arose. The statement could not have been offered to rebut the 
state's alleged motive for fabrication because the motive was already in place at 
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the time Parmer was interviewed by officers. Parmer's statements to the officers 
thus did not fall under the I.RE. 801 (d)(1 )(B) hearsay exception. 
Because Parmer's attorney would have been unsuccessful had he 
attempted to utilize I.RE. 801 (d)(1 )(B) to admit the police interview, Parmer 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that his trial counsel's performance 
was deficient with regard to the exclusion of those statements, or that he suffered 
any prejudice from that deficiency. 
Further, even if Parmer's statements to police were admissible pursuant to 
I.RE. 801 (d)(1 )(8), and even if Parmer's counsel was deficient for not utilizing 
I.RE. 801 (d)(1 )(B) as a grounds for admission, Parmer has still failed to establish 
prejudice. While the district court did not expressly consider the prejudice prong 
of Strickland with regard to this claim, it did note that on direct appeal, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals concluded that, even if the district court erred in failing to admit 
the police interview into evidence, such error was not fundamental, in part 
because Parmer "testified at the trial and had an adequate opportunity to explain 
[the inconsistency] or put the confrontation call statements in proper context." 
(R, p.1109, n.3 (citing Parmer, 147 Idaho at 224, 207 P.3d at 200).) Parmer's 
varying explanations regarding his motive for using the vibrating device were not 
contradictory, they were simply inconsistent - and Parmer had the opportunity to 
address these inconsistencies at trial. 
Because Parmer has failed to show that his police interview was 
admissible pursuant to I.RE. 801 (d)( 1 )(8), and has failed to establish prejudice 
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from the absence of such evidence at trial, Parmer has failed to show the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
2. Parmer Failed To Establish Prejudice From His Trial Counsel's 
Failure To Elicit Additional Testimony Regarding The llioinguinal 
Nerve 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; 
Cowger, 132 Idaho at 685, 978 P.2d at 244. A reasonable probability "does not 
mean 'more likely than not'; it means a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 258, 233 P.3d 
186, 189 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-694). 
In his post-conviction petition, Parmer asserted that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to elicit testimony regarding the ilioinguinal nerve. (R., 
p.842.) According to Parmer's allegations and supporting documentation, "[s]uch 
testimony was critical in that it explained why K.R. may have believed that she 
was being stimulated in the genital area." (R., pp.25-26, 28-32, 842.) The 
ilioinguinal nerve, Parmer explained, is a branch of the first lumbar nerve that is 
distributed to the mons veneris and labia majora in women. (R., pp.25-26.) 
Further, "[a] stimulus in an area three inches or even more from the labia could 
subjectively be mistaken for physical contact with the clitoris and the labia." (R., 
p.26.) Parmer contended that this was intended to be the "core of the defense 
theory," but that trial counsel inadequately pursued this theory at trial. (R., 
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p.843.) Even assuming that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, 
Parmer has failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
this claim because he failed to establish prejudice from any deficiency resulting 
from the absence of this proposed testimony. 
As discussed above, K.R. testified not only that Parmer touched her 
vagina and clitoris with the vibrating device, but that he also penetrated her 
vagina with his fingers. (R., pp.489-490.) At closing argument, the state relied 
on K.R.'s description of the latter contact to establish the crime of lewd conduct. 
(R., p.726 ("We have to prove that at the moment in time when he sticks his 
fingers inside of her vagina, that he has a sexual intent. That is what we have to 
prove."); R., p.732 ("Common sense tells us the only reason fingers are inside of 
a person's vagina is for sexual gratification.")) 
The primary purpose of the evidence of Parmer's use of the vibrating 
device was thus to prove his sexual intent and the absence of mistake or 
accident in relation to his manual-genital contact with and penetration of K.R.'s 
vagina. This sexual intent and the absence of mistake or accident was 
established, overwhelmingly, by eight 1.R.E. 404(b) witnesses whom described a 
variety of inappropriate sexual contacts perpetrated by Parmer during massages, 
including kissing, digital-genital and oral-genital contact, other touching of the 
breast and genital areas, Parmer's rubbing or pressing of his groin against a 
victim's body, and some consensual sexual encounters, all of which arose in the 
context of massage treatments. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 219, 207 P.3d at 195. 
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It is difficult to hypothesize a scenario in which the admission of testimony 
regarding the ilioinguinal nerve would have resulted in a different trial outcome. 
The jury would have had to have found that K.R. was lying about Parmer digitally 
penetrating her vagina (and thus not convicted on that basis), but was telling the 
truth about her perception that Parmer touched her vagina and clitoris with the 
vibrating device. The jury also would have had to have found that this latter 
contact with the vibrating device constituted "manual-genital contact," and 
accepted Parmer's explanation that contact with K.R.'s ilioinguinal nerve resulted 
in an incorrect subjective perception - all in the context of a trial containing the 
eight l.R.E. 404(b) witnesses. Taken together, this is too tenuous a hypothesized 
scenario for Parmer to show a "reasonable probability" that there would have 
been a different trial outcome had the proposed testimony been elicited at trial. 
Further, any prejudice was mitigated by the fact that Parmer was, in fact, 
able to testify on direct examination about the concept of "radiating" sensations 
caused by the vibrating device. (R., pp.715-716.) Parmer testified that when the 
vibrating device is applied to someone, the sensation does not remain local to 
the area of application, but "distribute[s] through the whole nerve pathway that it 
was in contact with." (R., p.716.) Specifically, Parmer noted that when the 
vibrating device is placed on the inner thigh, the sensation would radiate "[i]nto 
the private parts." (Id.) This testimony is substantially similar to that Parmer 
asserts should have been elicited. 
The admission of more detailed scientific testimony about the ilioinguinal 
nerve may only have served to strengthen the state's argument that Parmer had 
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the requisite sexual intent while engaging in this contact with K.R, since Parmer 
was aware of the concept of the ilioinguinal nerve and of the radiating qualities of 
the vibrating device. (R., pp.25-26, 698, 715-716.) Parmer was aware of the 
effect on K.R. that this type of contact was likely to have. (R., pp.698, 715-716.) 
It can thus reasonably be inferred from this knowledge and from Parmer's actions 
that Parmer intended to sexually arouse K.R, and/or himself. 
Even assuming that Parmer's counsel was deficient for failing to elicit 
testimony regarding the ilioinguinal nerve, Parmer failed to establish a 
reasonable probability that the admission of such testimony would have resulted 
in a different trial outcome. He has therefore failed to show that the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
summary dismissal of Parmer's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 19th day of February, 2013. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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